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Abstract 
This paper derives from the findings of a recent qualitative and quantitative study conducted by the 
Support to Life Association among Syrian refugees in Istanbul to make their vulnerability assessment 
with a particular focus on their strong attachment to this city. The research question to be answered in 
this paper is to what extent Istanbul provides Syrian refugees with a space of cultural intimacy, where 
they feel safe and secure despite the difficulties of everyday life. The main premise of the paper is that 
historical, cultural and religious forms of affinity are likely to particularly attach the Sunni-Muslim-
Arab-Syrians originating from Aleppo province to Istanbul. However, this sense of safety is not free 
from various sources of exploitation. This paper is expected to contribute to the discipline of Refugee 
Studies by shedding light on the historical elements and the agency that are often neglected in such 
analysis. 
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Syrians, Refugee Studies, cultural intimacy, Turkey, Istanbul, Aleppo. 
 1 
Introduction* 
Having triggered the worst refugee crisis since World War II, the war in Syria has left almost 12 
million people in desperate need of humanitarian aid. There are currently 7.6 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), while over 4 million people have taken refuge in Syria’s immediate 
neighbourhood: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (UNHCR, 2015). Among these countries, due to its 
open border policy, Turkey has received the largest number of Syrian refugees, who mostly originate 
from the Aleppo region in northern Syria. It is estimated that there are around 3 million Syrian 
refugees residing in Turkey, and around 500 thousand of them are settled in Istanbul. Turkey has a lot 
of challenges ahead, not only with regard to the integration of refugees but also to the re-enactment of 
democracy in the aftermath of the failed coup of 15 July 2016. Societal and political polarization of 
the country has become very evident since the #occupygezi movement of June 2013, and the refugees 
are also becoming more and more exposed to such divides. There is a growing popular resentment 
against the Syrian refugees, which has become even more detectable after the Turkish government 
explicitly announced in the summer of 2016 that a number of Syrian refugees will be granted Turkish 
citizenship. The level of popular resentment increases even more in the Southeast Anatolia among the 
Kurdish and Alevi origin local populations due to the rumours that the government is becoming more 
likely to demographically instrumentalize Sunni-Muslim-Arabs to counter balance the ethno-
nationalist and centrifugal claims of the Kurds.  
Apparently, the task of the neighbouring states including Turkey is a difficult one. But, the task of 
the European Union member states is not easy either. Refugee crisis is reinforcing the growth of the 
populist movements in the EU -a development which was already triggered by the financial crisis and 
neo-liberal forms of governmentality. So far, the EU has been relying on the Turkey-EU refugee deal 
signed on 18 March 2016. It seems that the deal has so far been successful in bringing down the 
number of refugees trying to go to the EU countries as well as the number of border deaths. Thomas 
Spijkerboer (2016) has even found that the deal has also been instrumental in breaking the business 
model of smugglers. The message of the deal to refugees is that “getting on a boat in Turkey, and 
endangering lives in the process, is not worth the risk given that there is a legal and safe pathway 
through resettlement” (Spijkerboer, 2016; Collett, 2016). According to the March 18 agreement 
between Turkey and the EU, irregular migrants who arrived in the Greek islands from Turkey after 20 
March 2016 would be sent back to Turkey. In accordance with the articles of the Agreement, the EU 
was to resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey to the bloc for each Syrian that Greece returns back to 
Turkey. In return, Turkey is to receive up to 6 billion euros, visa-free travel and fast track negotiations 
on EU accession as a result of the refugee agreement with the EU.
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 For a detailed Account of the current state of the agreement see the Letter from President Juncker to the President and the 
Members of the European Council on progress in the implementation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, Brussels, 17 
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what Jean-Claude Juncker said in his statement, some others claim the other way around, and point out that the agreement 
has failed and resulted with the deterioration of the state of refugees in the Greek islands. See Karnitschnig and Delcker 
(2016). 
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How do the Syrian refuges cope with the difficulties they come across in everyday life in Istanbul? 
This is the main research question to be answered in this paper. The main premise of the paper is that 
Syrians living in Turkey in general, and in Istanbul in particular, have not only chosen Turkey as a 
refuge because of its geographical proximity, but also because of its cultural intimacy stemming from 
the common Ottoman past. Referring to the findings of a recent survey conducted in Istanbul in late 
2015 and early 2016, the paper will display to what extent Istanbul provides Syrian refugees with a 
comfort zone, or a space of cultural intimacy, where they feel safe and secure despite the difficulties of 
everyday life. The structure of the paper will be as follows: primarily, the methodology and the 
universe of the research will briefly be elaborated on so that the reader will have an understanding of 
the major districts of the city of Istanbul, where most of the Syrian refugees have found refuge. 
Secondly, the notion of cultural intimacy, from which the main rationale of this paper derives, will be 
theoretically discussed in relation to the writings of Michael Herzfeld (2005, 2013, 2016). Thirdly, a 
short literature survey will be undertaken to depict the state of Refugee Studies in Turkey, which 
appear to have two missing elements, namely a historicist perspective and the agency of refugees 
themselves. Fourthly, the legal status and the ways, in which Syrians have been framed by state actors 
since the early days of their arrival in Turkey, will be elaborated on in order to explicate the structural 
constraints, which form the ground for their societal exclusion and exploitation on the labour market 
as well as in other spheres of life. Fifthly, the main scope of this paper will be dedicated to discuss in 
detail the historical, cultural, religious and societal links bridging Aleppo and Istanbul, which provide 
Syrian refugees with a protective shield against the traumatic experiences resulting from the war and 
the act of resettlement. Eventually, the social networks followed by Syrian refugees and the sense of 
safety, cultural intimacy, iconicity and comfort as well as the risk of exploitation attached to them will 
be explained along with the testimonies from the fieldwork. 
Methodology and the universe of the research 
This work is based on the findings of a recent qualitative and quantitative study conducted in six 
districts of Istanbul between the last quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016. Both Syrian refugees 
and Turkish receiving community members and organizations have been interviewed in one-on-one 
interviews, focus group discussions and via structured questionnaires. Six districts in Istanbul, namely 
Küçükçekmece, Başakşehir, Bağcılar, Fatih, Sultanbeyli and Ümraniye, have been surveyed in order 
to identify the needs and vulnerabilities of the Syrian refugee population in Istanbul. In order to 
identify a random sampling of the target population, in line with the requirements of statistical 
analysis, the districts were chosen due to their diverse geographic locations in Istanbul (four on the 
European and two on the Asian side of the city). These districts host the highest number of Syrians in 
Istanbul that are underserved, and often subject to live together with other marginalized communities 
in the city such as Kurds, Alevis, and the Roma. The needs assessment study has been carried out by 
the Support to Life Association (Hayata Destek Derneği) under the supervision of the author to collect 
data through a multitude of research technics: in-depth interviews conducted by Syrian-origin 
researchers as well as senior Turkish researchers in each of the six districts with key informants 
working in the host community for a total of 200 individuals. These included Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) conducted with both Syrian refuges (male and female) and the local host 
community members in each district (18 FGDs with Syrian refugees, 6 FDGs with host community 
members) with a total of 136 individuals; and Household (HH) Surveys which were conducted by 
Arabic-speaking Syrian assessment officers in each district with an estimated average of 6 individuals 
per household, amounting to a total of 124 surveys and 744 individuals (Kaya and Kıraç, 2016). The 
quotations used in this work were taken from the focus group meetings to exemplify some of the 
mostly repeated statements and insights shared by the refugees and the local inhabitants. 
The surveys and Focus Groups Discussions were conducted by Syrian researchers, who speak 
Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish (if necessary). The interviewers who conducted the structured surveys 
were themselves either ethnically Arabic or Kurdish Syrians, or Syrian-Palestinians. The survey 
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questions were written in English and then translated by the Syrian staff into Arabic. The interview 
teams were between 20-30 years of age. The field officers worked in teams, generally one male and 
one female officer, but if the interlocutor was not comfortable, same-sex teams were assigned on-
demand. Essentially, if a woman was home alone and did not want a male in her home – the field 
supervisor would send two female officers to conduct the interviews. In-depth interviews with local 
stakeholders were conducted by Turkish-speaking Support to Life Association team members. 
The research has been conducted in six districts of Istanbul hosting a very sizeable group of 
Syrians: Fatih, Küçükçekmece, Başakşehir, Bağcılar, Sultanbeyli and Ümraniye. Fatih is a district 
located in the European part of Istanbul and is named after Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror of 
Constantinople. Fatih contains very cosmopolitan areas like Aksaray, Fındıkzade, Çapa, and Vatan 
Avenue. The district does not only host conservative background communities of Muslims but also 
many different international migrant communities ranging from transit migrants from Sub-Saharan 
Africa to Syrian refugees, Central Asian Turkic migrants, Russian tourists as well as Armenians, 
Georgians, and many other groups. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Fatih is probably one 
of the most cosmopolitan urban spaces in the entire world. Besides its cosmopolitan context, it is also 
known for its extreme conservative image because of the religious community of the Çarşamba 
quarter within the district. Fatih also includes the historical peninsula of the city, Sultanahmet, with its 
historical Byzantine walls and very visible Ottoman heritage. It is this conservative, cosmopolitan and 
Ottoman heritage, which seems to be attractive to many Syrian refugees coming from Aleppo, which 
was the third most cosmopolitan Ottoman state after Istanbul and Izmir until the early 20
th
 century 
(Watenpaugh, 2005). Fatih has recently become a diasporic space of intimacy for Syrian Arabs, where 
they have constructed a new home away from their original homeland, a “Little Syria”.2 
Map 1. Location of the 6 districts targeted for the needs assessment data collection 
 
Source: Google Maps 
                                                     
2
 It has become very popular recently in the media to represent such diasporic spaces like Fatih, where Syrians are trying 
to reconstruct their new homes after the image of their original homeland. For related media coverage see Benjamin 
(2016). 
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Küçükçekmece lies on the European shore of the Sea of Marmara, in a lagoon named Lake 
Küçükçekmece. This district has recently hosted colossal public housing projects around the lake 
adjacent to old working-class neighbourhoods inhabited by many internally displaced Kurds 
originating from eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey (Kaya and Işık, 2008). These local Kurdish 
elements seem to have pulled Kurdish-speaking Syrian refugees to the district, who have followed 
already existing ethno-cultural networks.  
Başakşehir is situated in the European part of Istanbul between the two sweet water reservoirs of 
the city, Büyükçekmece and Küçükçekmece lakes. This district is completely covered with large public 
housing complexes. This is why it offers a rich array of housing opportunities to these newcomers. 
Middle-class Syrian refugees also find it easier to be accommodated in this district due to such a rich 
housing market. The district has a huge service sector together with facilities of construction business.  
Bağcılar is also located in the European part of the city, neighbouring Atatürk Airport. This 
neighbourhood has only been urbanized throughout the last three decades. Most of the houses in 
Bağcılar have been illegally built, Gecekondu (shanty towns), which are now being replaced by rows 
of cramped apartment buildings built with minimal regulation. It is particularly in this district that 
many public housing constructions can be found. Bağcılar is now populated by new immigrants 
from the southeastern parts of Anatolia, mostly young families, poor and internally displaced Kurds 
(IDPs) (Kaya and Işık, 2008). This district also hosts vibrant youth cultures, such as rap and graffiti. It 
is, at the same time, also a conservative, Islamist and right-wing stronghold with very strong support 
for the ruling AKP government. Bağcılar also houses a great amount of industry, particularly textile 
businesses, printing companies, TV channels, a huge wholesale market for dry goods, a large second-
hand car market, and many trucking and logistics companies. Similar to the former Kurdish origin 
IDPs, Syrian refugees also mostly work in the informal labour market, predominantly in textile 
workshops and construction business.  
Sultanbeyli is a working-class suburb on the Asian side of Istanbul. It is one of the electoral 
strongholds of Conservative-Islamist political parties, such as the ruling AKP government. This 
district houses several different religious communities attracting Syrian refugees as well. Eventually, 
Ümraniye is one of the largest working-class districts in Istanbul. Formerly, it was a gecekondu 
district hosting domestic migrants coming from eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey until the 
1990s. Textile, construction and service sectors are very present in the district, and these sectors attract 
Syrian refugees to find jobs in the informal economy. 
Cultural Intimacy and Iconicity 
In his path-breaking ethnographic book, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State, 
Michael Herzfeld (1997- Second Edition 2005) elaborated on what he called “cultural intimacy” 
generated by the Greeks, which is a strong sense of difference between what they presented to the 
outside and what they know about themselves on the inside. Herzfeld defines cultural intimacy as “the 
recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external 
embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality” 
(2005:3). However, he later draws our attention to the fact that the term “cultural intimacy” was often 
perceived in the literature as the simple idea of acquaintance with a culture (Herzfeld, 2013: 491), 
which is also what I am more inclined to do in this paper. I will claim in this paper that Arabic-
Speaking-Sunni-Syrians have already created comfort zones in various districts of Istanbul, which 
seems to provide them with a cultural intimacy with regard to religious, moral, architectural, urban, 
and sometimes linguistic similarities originating from the common Ottoman past of the Turks and the 
Arabs.  
Herzfeld’s notion of cultural intimacy does not only refer to ‘the sharing of known and 
recognizable traits’ with the ones inside, but it also refers to those traits ‘disapproved by powerful 
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outsiders’ (Herzfeld 1997: 94; Byrne, 2011: 148). I will argue that this second component of cultural 
intimacy comes into play when the Syrian refugees residing in Istanbul are asked to express their 
opinion about migrating further away to the European Union countries. As will be discussed shortly, 
the Syrian refugees interviewed in this study are predominantly willing to stay in Istanbul and not 
willing to go to Europe. Their hesitation to go to Europe seems to be deriving partly from their strong 
belief that they are disapproved by the Europeans, and partly from the life-threatening nature of the 
journey, which has already led to the death of thousands of people en route. It was often put forward 
by the interlocutors during the research that the tragedies that their Syrian fellows had to go through 
during their exodus from Syria to Greece have left very negative marks on them. The traces of the 
hearth-breaking images of Ailan Kurdi, whose dead body was laying down on the Aegean shores of 
Bodrum, Turkey (Smith, 2015), were still fresh in the minds of the interlocutors when interviewed. 
Herzfeld’s notion of cultural intimacy incudes various acts and attitudes repeated by members of a 
group of people, which lead to the formation of a Manichean understanding of the world divided 
between “us” and “them”. These acts and attitudes may range from essentializating culture and past, 
practicing various stereotypes in everyday life, performing persuasive acts of resemblances, ordinary 
acts of embarrassment kept as intimate secrets of the group, and different forms of iconicity
3
 such as 
mythical, visual, musical and gastronomic images bridging a sense of resemblance with the other 
members of the group at large (Herzfeld, 2016, 3rd edition). According to Herzfeld (2016: 33), 
essentialization and reification of the past and culture is not only an ideological element 
instrumentalized by political institutions and states to control and manipulate the masses, but also an 
indispensable element of social life. Hence, ordinary individuals also tend to essentialize and reify the 
past for their own use to come to terms with the hardships of everyday life. Essentializing the past 
partly makes it possible for private individuals to create the semiotic effect of what Herzfeld (2016: 
33) calls iconicity, the principle of signification by virtue of resemblance, which contributes to the 
formation of a Manichean understanding of the world divided between “us” and “them”. Mythical, 
visual, musical, heroic, even gastronomic iconicities are all likely to contribute to the formation of this 
Manichean world (Herzfeld, 2016: 33). In this work, it will also be claimed that the Syrian refugees 
residing in Istanbul at large, and in conservative neighbourhoods in particular, are likely to construct 
bridges between themselves and the members of the majority society by means of visual, musical, 
religious, gastronomic, and even linguistic iconicities, which create a space of intimacy the host 
communities. 
Refugee Studies in Turkey 
This study, which we have conducted in Istanbul, certainly falls into the category of Refugee Studies, 
which is a rather newly developing field. Dawn Chatty and Philip Marfleet explain very eloquently 
how Refugee Studies was first born in the 1980s as a state-centric discipline and, like many other 
disciplines, defending the interests of nation-states, and how it has become more critical in due course 
(Chatty and Marfleet, 2013). There are two very essential elements that seem to be missing in Refugee 
Studies in Turkey. Firstly, scientific studies conducted in Turkey regarding the situation of Syrian 
refugees often contribute to their statisticalization rather than to make their social, economic and 
political expectations visible to the receiving society (inter alia, Gümüş and Eroğlu, 2015; Kilic and 
Ustun, 2015; Erdoğan, 2015; and Oytun and Şenyücel, 2015). Most of the studies in Turkey are either 
statisticalizing refugees, or concentrating on the host society’s perceptions of refugees. What is 
missing here is the lack of anthropological research permitting the refugees to speak for themselves. 
As Gadi Benezer and Roger Zetter once stated very well, such an anthropological research could make 
                                                     
3
 The term iconicity derives from the word Greek word, eikôn, which literally means likeness conveying the imitation of 
the divine. However, in modern usage, the term icon carries a misleading meaning, which is often interchangeably used 
with “emblem”. Michael Herzfeld’s use of the term iconicity derives from its original meaning, which has something to 
do with resemblance. For further explanation on the term see Herzfeld (2016: 93).  
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it potentially easier to occupy a space within the host population as well as in the public domain 
(Benezer and Zetter, 2014). A point of view can be offered which includes, beside their trauma and 
sufferings, their active rather than passive stance and their resourcefulness, motivation and 
commitment that was needed in order to escape from their homelands and sanctuary.  
Furthermore, what is also missing in Refugee Studies in Turkey is a retrospective analysis of 
refugee experiences in the country dating back to the early ages of the Republic as well as the Ottoman 
Empire. This is not only the missing link in the Turkish Refugee Studies field, but also the missing 
element in Refugee Studies in the rest of the world. Philip Marfleet relates this problem to the 
limitations of the nation-states: “If the territorial borders of modern states confined some people and 
excluded some others, “nationalized” intellectual agendas have largely excluded migration as a 
legitimate area of study” (Marfleet, 2013).  
Actually, Anatolia has always been exposed to several different forms of refugee and migration 
practices throughout its history. Since the Byzantium era, Anatolia has hosted many different groups 
of people who found refuge in there. Anatolia has become gradually Muslimized throughout history 
along with the migration of dominantly Turkish and Muslim-origin populations. Jewish migration to 
the Ottoman Empire after their expulsion from Spain and Portugal in 1492 was an exception. The 
Muslimization of Anatolia became even more visible in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when 
the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were shrinking rapidly (Erdoğan ve Kaya, 2015). The expulsion 
of Crimean and Circassian Muslims escaping from the atrocities of the Russian Empire in the second 
half of the 19th century was comparable in terms of size to the migration of Iranians, Turks, Kurds, 
Bosnians, Kosovars and Syrians escaping the violent conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans 
starting in the early 1980s (Kaya, 2005).  
The first wave of refugees in modern times was from Iran, following the 1979 Revolution. Other 
major refugee flows were Kurds escaping from Iraq in 1988, which numbered at almost 60,000; and in 
1991, when half a million people from Iraq found safe refuge in Turkey. In 1989, with Bulgaria’s 
“Revival Process”, which was an assimilation campaign against minorities, almost 310,000 ethnic 
Turks sought refuge in Turkey. In the following years, during the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Kosovo, Turkey granted asylum to 25,000 Bosnians and 18,000 Kosovars (Kirişçi and Karaca, 
2015). Turkey has been positioned on the transit route for irregular migrants from Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan since the 1990s (İçduygu, 2015). Turkey is also a destination for 
human trafficking in the Black Sea region, with victims usually coming from Moldova, Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In the meantime, Turkey has long been a country of 
destination for immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as these new 
immigrants see Turkey as a gateway to a new job, a new life, and a stepping stone to employment in 
the West (İçduygu, 2009). Its geographical location has made Turkey a crucial place on irregular 
migration routes, especially for migrants trying to move to EU countries. Turkey’s position in the 
migration process is a unique one and it is becoming an important site, not just for new national 
settlers, but also for today’s international settlers. Turkey, and especially Istanbul, has become a more 
complicated site demographically with the new arrivals, but not yet very visible, and other 
international migrants, mostly originating from the EU countries, especially from Germany and 
Russia.
4
 Obviously, Turkish migration and asylum laws and policies were not able to meet the needs 
of these radical demographic changes resulting from global and regional transformations. Thus, 
migration and asylum laws and policies had to go through a substantial review process to prepare the 
country to come to terms with the changing conditions in the region.  
                                                     
4
 According to the EUROSTAT figures, there were 175,000 foreign citizens residing in Turkey, and 75,000 of them were 
EU citizens. The contradiction between national, European and other sources is a matter, which is also accepted by the 
staff of the Turkish Statistical Institution (TÜİK). See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-11072012-
AP/EN/3-11072012-AP-EN.PDF, accessed on 15 September 2015. 
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Temporary Protection: guests, but not refugees? 
Traditionally known as emigration countries, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have also become 
settlement and transit spaces for economic and forced migrants (De Bel-Air, 2006; Pérouse, 2013). 
Syrian refugees have been considered as “guests” by the Turkish, Lebanese and Jordanian states. From 
the very beginning of the refugee plight, Syrians have been presented as if they are ‘welcome’ by the 
host states and societies on the basis of some deep-rooted values such the ‘Turkish hospitality’, 
‘Muslim fraternity’, ‘Arab hospitality’ and ‘guesthood’ traditions (De Bel-Air, 2006; Pérouse, 2013; 
Chatty, 2013; El Abed, 2014; Kirişçi, 2014; Erdoğan, 2015; Erdoğan and Kaya, 2015). The reason 
why Turkey is trying to define the Syrians in a different legal status is because it continues to have the 
geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Refugees. 
Accordingly, Turkey only accepts those people as refugees if they are coming from the European 
countries. Although the geographical limitation was removed for most of the members by the 1967 
Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention, Turkey decided to keep it together with Congo, 
Madagascar and Monaco.  
To this extent, a more recent metaphor to qualify the role that the Turkish state and the pious 
Muslim-Turks should play for Syrians in Turkey has been the Ansar spirit (Arabic for helpers). As a 
metaphor, Ansar refers to the people of Medina, who supported the Prophet Mohammad and the 
accompanying Muslims (muhajirun, or migrants) who migrated there from Mecca, which was under 
the control of the pagans. The metaphor of Ansar originally points at a temporary situation as the 
Muslims later returned to Mecca after their forces recaptured the city from the pagans (Korkut, 2015).
5
 
Hence, the Turkish government has used a kind of Islamic symbolism to legitimize its acts on the 
resolution of the Syrian refugee crisis. The government leaders have consistently compared Turkey’s 
role in assisting the Syrian refugees to that of the Ansar, referring to the Medinans who helped 
Muhammad and his entourage. Framing the Syrian refugees within the discourse of Ansar and 
Muhajirun has elevated public and private efforts to accommodate Syrian refugees from a 
humanitarian responsibility to a religious and charity based duty (Erdemir, 2016), a point I shall return 
shortly. 
  
                                                     
5
 Haber7 (2014). “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Bizler Ensar sizler muhacir” (The President Erdoğan: We are Ansar you are 
muhacir), http://www.haber7.com/ic-politika/haber/1208342-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-bizler-ensar-sizler-muhacir 
accessed on 4 October 2016. 
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Table 1: Number of Syrian refugees living in 10 cities (20 October 2016, Ministry of Interior).
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The framing of the refugee reality by state actors as an act of benevolence and tolerance has also 
shaped public opinion in a way which has led to the exposure of some racist and xenophobic attitudes 
vis-a-vis refugees. This is why it is not a surprise that Turkish society has witnessed several lynching 
attempts, stereotypes, prejudices, communal conflicts and other forms of harassments performed 
against Syrians (Gökay, 2015). The massive increase in the number of refugees outside camps and the 
lack of adequate assistance policies toward them has aggravated a range of social problems. Refugees 
experience problems of adaptation in big cities and the language barrier seriously has complicated 
their ability to integrate into Turkish society. There are several problems the Syrians have been facing 
in everyday life. There is now a growing concern about underage Syrian girls being forced into 
marriage as well as fears that a recent constitutional court ruling decriminalizing religious weddings 
without civil marriage will lead to a spread of polygamy involving Syrian women and girls (Kirişçi 
and Ferris, 2015). The sight of Syrians begging in the streets is causing particular resentment among 
local people, especially in the western cities of Turkey. There have also been reports of occasional 
violence between refugees and the local population. In turn, this reinforces a growing public 
perception that Syrian refugees are associated with criminality, violence and corruption. These 
attitudes contrast with local authorities’ and security officials’ observations that in reality, criminality 
is surprisingly low and that Syrian community leaders are very effective in preventing crime and 
defusing tensions between refugees and locals (Kirişçi and Karaca, 2015). 
  
                                                     
6
 DGMM Figures http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik. The number of those living 
in the 22 refugee camps around the Turkish-Syrian border is more than 250.000. 
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Map 2. Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Source: Human Rights Watch 
 
At times of economic and political instability, the nationalist and populist agenda has become more 
visible, and authorities attempt to generalize hostility towards others who are culturally, ethnically and 
religiously different. Refugees are easily portrayed as inferior, malign, dangerous or threatening.
7
 
Lacking resources of public communication and relevant language skills, most of the refugees are 
unable to contest such labellings, stereotypes and xenophobic attitudes generated by the majority 
society (Marfleet, 2007). Such a xenophobic discourse was also employed by the main oppositional 
parties prior to the 07 June 2015 General Elections in their electoral campaigns. The Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) used a populist discourse scapegoating 
the Syrian refugees for the political, social and economic ills in Turkey. The Syrian refugees were 
instrumentalized by both parties to express their critics against the AKP, which they blamed for 
deepening the Syrian crisis in the first place, thus leading to the massive migration of Syrians to 
Turkey at the expense of Turkish citizens (Werz et al, 2015). Upon growing criticisms coming from 
civil society organizations and academics, it should also be noted here that both parties, especially the 
CHP, gave up such discourses prior to the second general elections held on 01 November 2015, and 
have since then used a rather constructive and friendly discourse vis-a-vis the Syrians.
8
 However, the 
party has not totally toned down its anti-refugee stance especially at the leadership level after the June 
7 elections. When criticising the EU deal in March 2016, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the CHP 
                                                     
7
 For a detailed account of the ways n which refugees have been portrayed in such terms see Wodak and van Dijk (2000), 
Walters (2006), and Inda (2006). 
8
 For further detail on the CHP’s promises to the Syrians see Canyaş et al. (2015). One should also be reminded that the 
Kurdish-origin Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) had prepared the most promising manifesto in both elections with 
regard to the promises to Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Furthermore, the CHP has prepared a very detailed report on 
Syrian refugees with the involvements of academics, NGOs, local municipalities and the Syrians themselves. See 
http://www.igamder.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/SINIRLAR-ARASINDA-BASKI2.pdf  
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uttered the following words: “Let’s give them [the European Union] 6 billion Euros, and they take all 
Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis themselves”.9 
Discursive shift from temporariness to permanency 
Soon it turned out that framing the refugees as “guests” was not sustainable in terms of 
accommodating their urgent needs as well as of coming to terms with the increasing resentment 
among the local populations vis-à-vis the refugees. Turkey first introduced a Temporary Protection 
Directive for the refugees in 2014, based on Articles 61 to 95 of the Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection, which came into force in April 2014. The directive grants almost all of the 
social and civil rights that refugees enjoy in western societies.
10
 Accordingly, Turkey has provided 
Syrians with temporary protection which consists of three elements: an open-door policy for all 
Syrians; no forced returns to Syria (non-refoulement); and unlimited duration of stay in Turkey.  
Despite the rights granted under the Temporary Protection Directive dating from 04 April 2013, 
refugees have encountered huge problems in the spheres of health, education, labour market, and 
housing in Turkey.
11
 Due to the fact that there are not very reliable and sufficient official data on the 
social-economic status of refugees, one cannot correctly make estimations about the number of 
refugee children who actually do enjoy the right to primary education, or of refugees who do have 
access to health care, or those given the right to work. It is estimated that around 30-35 percent of 
Syrian refugees in Turkey are school-aged children. This amounts to around 993,000 children that 
need to be attending school. While AFAD (Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate) 
is providing education for children in 70 schools and the Ministry of Education is offering it in 
approximately 75 locations outside the camps, the number of children receiving education is around 
300,000 compared to the half a million who need it. It is simply not feasible to accommodate such a 
high number of school children in the national education institutions in the entire country (Kılıç and 
Üstün, 2015).  
Even if it is logistically and practically possible, a remarkable number of Syrian refugee families 
cannot register their children to school as they send them to work in informal labour market, mainly in 
textile, construction and service sectors. Child labour as a coping strategy is a common practice among 
the Syrian refugees living in Istanbul. For instance, our study in Istanbul revealed that 26,6 percent of 
the survey participants send their school-age children to work so that they could contribute to family 
income. 20,3 percent stated that they cannot afford to pay for their education, while 14,1 percent stated 
that schools do not accept them because there is not space for the children at the local schools. When 
the interlocutors were asked about the places where they send their children to work, half of those 
sending their children to work (26,6 percent) stated that their children work in textile sector (clothing, 
shoes, etc.) while the others work in service sector (small shops, catering, cafes, restaurants), 
construction sector and industrial sector (furniture factories, automobile factories, etc.) (Kaya and 
Kıraç, 2016). 
Soon after the implementation of the Temporary Protection regulation, which still frame the 
refugees with a state of temporariness, some discursive shifts were witnessed in the media with regard 
to the state actors’ changing position on the permanent character of at least some of the Syrian 
refugees in Turkey. These discursive shifts have so far mainly emphasised the permanent nature of the 
issue - introduction of work permits in early 2016, incorporation of pupils into public schools, creating 
                                                     
9
 For the media coverage of the statements of Kılıçdaroğlu see Milliyet (26 April 2016), http://www.milliyet.com.tr/chp-
lideri-kilicdaroglu-ndan-sert/siyaset/detay/2234227/default.htm, and Haber Türk (12 March 2016), 
http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1208609-kemal-kilicdaroglu-suriyeliler-butun-duzenimizi-bozacak. 
10
 For the text of the Geneva Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees see 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10  
11
 For the official text of the Temporary Protection Regulation see http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/_dokuman28.pdf  
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quotas for Syrian students in higher education institutions, granting citizenship to the Syrians, and 
some statements from political figures such as the President Erdoğan and the Deputy PM Numan 
Kurtuluş.12 It has become obvious that the Turkish state is more engaged now in integrating refugees 
to social, economic and political spheres of life as well as in trying to engage the local municipalities 
in taking responsibility in the integration of migrants and refugees.
13
 
A tale of two cities: from Aleppo to Istanbul 
There are several factors that set the ground for the Syrian Civil War. Socio-political, environmental, 
and economic elements such as unemployment, climate change, drought, water management stress, 
and poverty can be enumerated as some of the elements elevating the risk of a civil war. The 
unemployment rate in Syria used to be relatively moderate compared to other countries in the Middle 
East; however, youth unemployment rate was always high. The unemployment rate among youth aged 
between 15 and 24 stood at 26 percent in 2002, close to the Middle Eastern average (Kabbani and 
Kamel, 2007). What distinguished the Syrian case was that unemployment rates among young people 
were more than six times higher than those among adults, the highest ratio among the countries in the 
Middle East. This high rate of unemployment among the youth population triggered dissatisfaction 
against the regime of the Ba’ath Party and caused a brain drain of skilled workforce in the country. 
Another important factor, which is often neglected and, yet, is hugely important, are climate change 
and droughts (Schwartz and Notini, 1994; and Zachariah et al., 2001). Seven significant droughts 
occurred in Syria between 1900 and 2011, where the average rainfall dropped to one third of the 
normal level (Gleick, 2014). The latest one, which started in 2006, was described as the worst long-
term drought, and most severe set of crop failures since agricultural civilizations began and caused 
agricultural failures, economic dislocations, and population displacement. These effects are attributed 
by some experts to be playing an essential role in spurring violence in the country (Femia and Werrell, 
2012). During the civil war, access to clean water also deteriorated, threatening the health of the 
population. In 2013, UNICEF found that water availability in conflict-affected areas decreased to only 
one fourth compared to pre-crisis levels (UNICEF, 2013).  
  
                                                     
12
 For news coverage about President Erdoğan’s discourse on the Syrians being granted citizenshp, or dual nationality, see 
Hurriyet Daily News (11 July 2016), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-details-dual-citizenship-for-
syrians.aspx?pageID=238&nid=101428&NewsCatID=341; and about Deputy PM Numan Kurtuluş’s speech on granting 
citizenship to the Syrians see Daily Sabah (11 July 2016), http://www.dailysabah.com/money/2016/07/11/turkish-
citizenship-for-syrian-refugees-under-process-deputy-pm-kurtulmus-says;  
13
 Due to the lack of space in this paper, I will not go into detail of the activities undertaken by the state actors, local 
municipalities and the civil society organizations in Turkey for the integration of refugees and migrants. International 
Organization of Migration (IOM) is recently working with a group of scholars on preparing policy recommendations on 
the integration of migrants in collaboration with the Directorate General of Migration Management. Hence, one could 
argue that the refugee crisis has also brought about some substantial changes in the mindset of the state actors to prepare 
a solid integration policy in Turkey. Anectodal evidences Show that these attempts have increased in the aftermath of the 
Refugee Deal signed between Turkey and the EU on 18 March 2016. 
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Map 3. Aleppo Province in the late 19
th
 century, Source: www.nizip.com. 
 
The study on the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrians in Istanbul has found that around 87 percent of 
Syrians in Istanbul originate from the province of Aleppo, while only a small minority of 7.2 percent 
came from Damascus (Graph 1). The majority of the interlocutors interviewed (62.5 percent) entered 
Turkey through the Syrian border in Kilis, a southeastern city, while 16.7 percent entered from Hatay, 
and 9.2 percent from Gaziantep. Many of the interlocutors later followed their ethno-cultural and 
kinship networks leading them to Istanbul. In conflictual situations threatening the lives of locals, 
migrants are tempted to go to the remote places as far as their economic, social and cultural capital 
permits them to do so. Similarly, the reason why there are so many Syrians residing in the 
southeastern cities of Turkey such as Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis and Şanlıurfa is again not only because 
of their geographical proximity but also because of kinship relations dating back to the Ottoman era 
when all those cities were administratively linked to the Aleppo province (Vilayet) of the Ottoman 
Empire. In the same way, Assyrian Christians, Circassians and Yezidis found refuge in those cities, 
where their kins had settled during the Ottoman Empire, such as Istanbul, Mardin and Şirnak (Korkut, 
2015). This is what Nicolas van Hear has already indicated elaborately in his works on diasporas (van 
Hear, 1998; and 2004). The same inclination can also be found among Kurdish internally displaced 
persons, who had to leave their homelands in the southeastern parts of Turkey to go to different cities 
in the country, and even abroad if possible, since the mid-1990s (Kaya ve Işık, 2008). 
Graph 1. Place of origin of Syrians in Istanbul 
    
With the conflict in Syria now entering its sixth year, refugees are increasingly moving inland, beyond 
the border provinces. The Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) has 
reported that 220,000 Syrians (or 12 percent of the entire Syrian refugee population in Turkey) are 
registered in Istanbul as of March 2015. By July 2015, the number increased to over 317,000 with an 
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increase of 64 percent, while figures reached 395,000 by March 2016, particularly as irregular 
migration into Europe has increased. In the second half of 2016 some estimates are even as high as 
550,000 and these numbers are still growing. In just a four-month period between March 2015 and 
July 2015, the number of registered Syrians in Istanbul has increased by 64 percent (Graph 2). There 
are many reasons for families and individuals to move away from camps, and according to previous 
researches, many chose to relocate to urban centres due to the freedom of mobility which allows 
Syrians an opportunity to find networks. Additionally, urban settings potentially allow for better 
housing, better educational opportunities and more diverse, stable employment opportunities. Of 
course, the perception gap between urban settings and the reality, especially in a major metropolitan 
city, cannot be denied. Istanbul is the most attractive city where Syrian refugees of all ethnic 
backgrounds prefer to settle in.  
Graph 2. Point of entry into Turkey 
    
One of the most striking images about Aleppo was portrayed on 17 August 2016 when the image of a 
five-year-old boy, Omran Daqneesh, was filmed and circulated by the Aleppo Media Centre, an anti-
government activist group which posted a video on YouTube showing him sitting dazed and bloodied 
in the back of an ambulance after surviving a regime airstrike on the rebel-held Qaterji neighbourhood 
of Aleppo (Hunt, 2016). Following the images of Ailan Kurdi’s dead body lying down on the Aegean 
shores of Turkey in the summer of 2015, Omran immediately became another icon symbolizing the 
devastation and tragedy caused by the war in Syria, just like all the other wars. Similar to the majority 
of Syrians residing in Turkey, Ailan was also from the Province of Aleppo (Smith, 2015). 
Aleppo is one of the fourteen provinces of Syria, which is located in the northern part of the 
country between Idlib in the west, Hama in the south and Ar-Raqqah in the east. Before the war, it was 
the most crowded province in Syria with a population of more than 4,868,000 in 2011, almost one 
fourth of the total population of Syria. The province of Aleppo has the fifth biggest portion of Syria. 
Its capital is the city of Aleppo. The city of Aleppo was the second largest city in Syria with a 
population of more than 1.5 million people. It was the country’s most important centre for trade and 
manufacture and its central market area –souq [bazaar] - used to stretch out for more than 10 km in the 
middle of the city. There were small shops, stalls, warehouses and workshops crowding the narrow 
streets and alleys. The Aleppo souq was very important for the local, regional and national economy, 
but it had also become a tourist attraction, and it was described in glowing and romantic terms in local 
and foreign guidebooks. The unchanging and historical nature of the souq was highlightened, and the 
economy and ethos of the souq were portrayed as radically different from the rest of the city. Such 
descriptions fit into a ‘culturalistic’ view where the Middle Eastern souq was regarded as a symbol of 
tradition, unaffected by social change, and where people working there were bound together by 
affective ties (Rabo, 2006). These depictions have been paraphrased in the words of Annika Rabo, a 
social anthropologist, who conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Aleppo between 1997 and 2003. The 
city is in ruins now and its inhabitants have scattered around, mostly in Turkey. The reason why 
almost all of the former inhabitants of the province of Aleppo have found refuge in Turkey is not its 
geographical proximity. The reason is more complicated than that, and there are strong historical, 
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cultural and religious links between Aleppo and Anatolia dating back to the Ottoman Empire. In what 
follows here is a more detailed depiction of the history of the city traced back to the Ottomans.  
Ottoman authorities did not enumerate people using modern notions of race or ethnicity, and 
instead counted people on the basis of religion. However, the population description from the 1903 
edition of Aleppo's Salname, the provincial yearbook, provides a hint of this continuing 
cosmopolitanism, as well as changes in the bureaucratic formulation of difference (Watenpaugh, 
2005). It is recorded that in Aleppo there were Muslim Turks, Arabs, Turkomans, Circassians, Kurds, 
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenians, Syriacs, Maronites, Protestants, Chaldeans, Latin 
Catholics, and Jews. A plurality of the city's inhabitants was Turkish or Arabic-speaking Sunni 
Muslims, and 30 percent of the city's population were Arabic-speaking Christians and Jews (both 
Mizrahi and Sephardic) (Salname, 1903). By 1922, alongside Beirut, it had become the chief 
resettlement centre for more than 50,000 primarily Turkish-speaking Armenian refugees from 
Anatolia. In the aftermath of the Ottoman hegemony (1918), most of the Turks were asked to leave the 
city by the Pan-Arabic nationalists guided by Prince Faisal, the Emir of Hijaz, who obtained the 
support of the British and had embarked upon the 'liberation of the nation'. Prince Faisal was a 
member of the Hashemites originating from the Prophet Mohammad’s lineage. The latest 
demographic data about the city is available from the 1957 census, and the data show that the city was 
mainly populated by Sunnis (1,045,455) and Christians (around 150,000) (Table 2) (Watenpaugh, 
2005). 
Table 2. The Population of Syria by religious communities and Muhafaza in 1957 
 Damascus Aleppo Homs Hama Latakia Hasaka Dayr al-
Zur 
Suwayda Dar΄a Total 
Sunnis  732,926  1,045,455  240,886  171,868  105,943  227,629  315,669  2,221  150,788  2,993,385 
Shi΄is  557  10,574  4,152  190  2  0  0  54  4  15,533 
Isma΄ilis 71  44  251  35,537  5,111  16  21  0  0  41,051  
Alawites  6,094  3,909  61,177  67,896  297,403  128  129  92  378  437,206 
Greek Orthodox  32,667  12,537  57,926  28,056  42,172  408  257  6,461  3,918  184,402 
Greek Catholic  25,948  14,725  8,344  569  1,058  74  18  3,830  6,858  61,424 
Jews  14,637  14,859  0  0  7  2,456  60  0  4  32,023 
Latins  668  4,924  565  16  892  31  28  0  0  7,124 
Syrian 
Orthodox 
 1,486  7,025  17,483  859  27  32,279  921  0  59  61,139 
Syrian Catholic  4,086  7,458  3,954  434  0  7,092  846  0  0  23,870 
Chaldeans  326  2,609  35  2  54  3,375  287  0  0  6,688 
Protestans  2,126  3,902  2,744  865  2,913  692  33  450  50  13,775 
Maronites  1,722  4,322  2,163  1,276  8,303  59  88  108  4  18,045 
Armenian 
Orthodox  
17,914  76,065  1,746  909  4,530  11,212  1,536  445  41  114,398 
Armenian 
Catholic  
2,677  11,972  1,579  91  528  2,714  806  154  122  20,643 
Druzes  21,508  1,232  24  13  22  11  35  106,959  9  129,813 
Yazidis  9  1,368  1  1  7  1,196  7  0  0  2,589 
Total  865,422  1,222,980  403,030  308,582  468,972  290,372  321,499  120,774  162,235  4,163,108 
(Source: Etude sur 'La Syrie Economique 1957', Annex 8). (Minor discrepancies in totals are due 
to the original source) 
In the early days following the end of World War I, a secular form of Pan-Arab nationalism made it 
possible for the inhabitants of Aleppo to live together in peace. A striking feature of the Pan-Arab 
nationalism was that it was mainly constructed as a response to the Pan-Turkist ideology of the 
Ottoman elite, which had become outspoken and popular among Turkish nationalists in the late 19
th
 
century (Çatı, 2013). Pan-Arab nationalism was based on the secular idea that the Arab is a non-
sectarian designation and that Muslims, Christians and Jews could be equally Arab and possess the 
same rights to full citizenship. In this version of Arabism, Islam had no role in governance or the basis 
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of legitimate authority. It should be recalled that Islamism in the Arab world partly emerged as a 
reaction against the imperialist division of Ottoman Muslims into separate states and the non-sectarian, 
emancipatory and bourgeois dimensions of interwar liberal Arab nationalism (Watenpaugh, 2005; and 
Hinnebusch and Zintl, 2015). 
Following the social networks 
Almost half of the interlocutors who were interviewed arrived in Istanbul in the previous one or two 
years (46.4 percent). On the other hand, 17.6 percent stated that they have been in Istanbul for the last 
three to four years. 36 percent of the interlocutors stated that they have only recently arrived in 
Istanbul (Graph 3). This finding indicates that there will be more to arrive through their networks. 
There are several theories, such as push and pull theory and rational choice theory, to be used to define 
the reasons and motives of migration. Probably, the Network Theory is the most applicable one to the 
case of Syrian Refugees living in Istanbul. The Network Theory is one of those theories that try to 
provide an empirical explanation of migration motives. Networks can be regarded as one of the main 
reasons of migration which serve as strong ties between migrants and potential migrants (king, 2012). 
These connections often become a social formation, which helps potential migrants as well as new 
migrants find their ways in the society where the old migrants have already established their lives. 
There are three types of networks: family networks, labour networks and “illegal” migrant networks 
(Boyd and Nowak, 2012). Labour networks are used widely, and it seems that it is also very 
explanatory for the Syrian refugees. Labour networks are widely applied in the process of migration. 
Not only do they help potential migrants in obtaining information about the availability of job 
vacancies, but also help new migrants settle before starting a job. Even though applying to labour 
networks might be helpful it should be highlighted that they cannot always be trusted. During the 
interviews, several interlocutors stated that their jobs had been provided to them via labour networks 
but then turned out to have poor working conditions as well as low salaries, which were not provided 
on time either.  
Graph 3. Arrival time in Istanbul 
   
Secondly, family networks provide new migrants with the feeling of hospitality, spaces of intimacy 
and a sense of familiarity, and help them preserve their culture and close ties with their families 
(Castles et al., 2013). According to Charles Tilly, even though networks can be beneficial on the other 
hand they may also create problems for the people who do not accomplish their commitment to society 
(Tily, 2007). Being a member of a network comes with obligations, and once the mission is not 
fulfilled it may cause exclusion of individuals from the networks. The other type of networks is illegal 
networks, which include human trafficking and smuggling. As noted by Boyd and Nowak illegal 
migrants try to have less ties with family or labour networks (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). Accordingly, 
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they do not engage in legal networks, but they try to find jobs through illegal connections. In this 
fieldwork, we have not come across such networks as reported by the interlocutors.  
Potential migrants and refugees tend to choose their places of migration according to the countries 
where they already have friends or family members or people they know, who come from their home 
countries. In this way, they can easily get information about the city they are planning to migrate to 
(King, 2012). The information reduces anxiety that potential migrants tend to have before they make 
decision about their destination. Networks can be regarded as one of the important clusters among 
migrants’ location choices. On the other hand, having networks eases the process of making decisions 
about the country of migration and render the process of integration much faster. Therefore, having 
networks in the country of destination can be one of the main reasons for migration for refugees, as 
well as for regular migrants (King, 2012). Once the first wave of migrants has settled in their new 
places of residence, they assist family members or friends in order to join them. Accordingly, the 
migration process for the second wave is made easier considering the costs and risks. Due to having 
information about previous examples, the migrant has the feeling of security and protection. This is 
what our research team has come across very often in the field. Most of the refugees try to establish 
stronger ties with previously migrated people in order to reduce their own costs and risks.  
Even though one of the strongest components of the network theories can be the family networks, 
weak ties may also play a significant role in the migration process (Tily, 2007). Relations between 
refugees and potential refugees may be weak, but once they are in a foreign environment these ties 
become even closer as they share the same language, ethnicity, culture, and religion. Therefore, they 
develop a mutual reliance on each other. This is what we have observed in focus group meetings, 
where we encountered many refugees originating from different cities and neighbourhoods in Syria, 
and who have established closer links in their places of residence in Istanbul. These relations often 
turn into close friendships as they try to provide information for each other, reducing costs, and 
comforting and consoling each other in terms of relieving the pains experienced in the migration 
process. Most importantly, new refugees are eager to get familiar with the experiences of the people 
who have migrated before them. It should be highlighted that networks, as one of the significant 
reasons for migration, have become more evident and useful as the internet has become more 
accessible to the wider society. Networks may also play a significant role before the act of migration. 
Being aware of existing networks, potential migrants are likely to walk the same path already 
experienced by other refugees, rather than taking the risk of migration without any actual information 
(Massey and Garcia-Espana, 1987). Such networks have the potential of providing refugees with a 
shield protecting them against the detrimental effects of a difficult journey and everyday life, as well 
as with a sense of ethno-cultural, religious, musical, visual and linguistic iconicity that gives them 
comfort and cultural intimacy in the land of the unknown. Thanks to the growing visibility of the 
internet in everyday life, refugees have been utilizing such networks to decide about their routes 
(Rebmann, 2016). 
Istanbul is safe despite everything! 
Survey results have shown that the primary rationale behind moving to Istanbul is to find a job (54.8 
percent). The second most expressed reason is to follow existing social networks such as family ties, 
relational links and other relevant social, ethno-cultural and religious networks. The third reason for 
refugees to settle in Istanbul seems to be providing security and safety for their families (Figure 1). 
What is striking here is the very low percentage of Syrians who are willing to live anywhere else than 
Istanbul. One could argue that Syrians residing in Istanbul are rather satisfied with where they are, and 
they are not considering to go elsewhere, such as for instance EU countries.  
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Figure 1. Reasons of settlement in Istanbul 
 
Marwa, a 28-year-old female living in the Sultanbeyli district on the Asian side of Istanbul, utters her 
feelings about Istanbul with the following words:  
“I feel safe here in Istanbul, and I don’t want to go back to Aleppo where we were moving from 
house to house due to the war. I want to stay here in Turkey, because it is similar to our traditions 
and culture, and my family is here. I don’t want to go to Europe either, because I have no one 
there. And I don’t want to go back to Syria at all, because I lost my husband there.”  
What attracts her to Istanbul is the cultural intimacy that the city offers as well as familial links already 
existing here. The research, which we have conducted together with the Support to Life Association, 
was undertaken in districts where mostly Sunni Arabs are residing. The staff of the Migration Unit of 
the Şişli Municipality in Istanbul has reported there in some parts of their districts there are quite a 
number of Kurdish-origin and Alevi-origin Syrians who have been searching for comfort and cultural 
intimacy in their own already existing social networks constructed by the Kurdish and Alevi 
inhabitants living mostly in Okmeydanı, one of the strongholds of left-wing oppositional groups with a 
working-class and ethno-class background.
14
 
The selection of the places of residence by the Syrian refugees is made in accordance with several 
different factors, some of which have been explained earlier. Cultural intimacy and ethno-religious 
affinity are the decisive elements shaping the decision with regard to the selection of the place of 
residence. The ways in which the host communities perceive the Syrian refugees is also a very 
important factor in shaping this decision. It is also revealed in other scientific studies that the host 
communities living in the border regions form their approach towards Syrians in accordance with their 
own ethnic, religious and political identities. For instance, there is sympathy towards the Kurds and a 
dislike against the Arabs in the places that Kurds constitute the majority. Kurds strongly assume that 
Arabs support radical groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, or al Nusra, who are believed to be fighting 
against the Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party) and YPG (People's Protection Units) forces in 
Syria. Whereas, Arabs believe that Kurds seek to divide Syria and support the PKK-affiliated parties. 
A big number of the Turkish citizens sympathize with Turkmens, while most of the Arab Alevis 
consider the Syrians entering Turkey as traitors to their own country. This is the reason why Syrians 
tend to move to places in Turkey, where people with similar ethnic, religious or sectarian identities 
live (Orhun, 2014; Erciyes, 2016).  
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It was also revealed that majority of the local residents in the six districts where we conducted the 
research have been supportive the rhetoric of Ansar Spirit reified by the state actors in general and the 
government in particular. The Ansar Spirit has been embraced by the pious Muslim Turkish citizens 
who perceive the Arabs and the Arabic language they speak as sacred. The fact that Prophet 
Mohammad was of Arab origin, and the language of Quran is Arabic makes a lot of sense for the pious 
Muslims in Turkey as well as in other non-Arabic geographies of Islam. The members of the local 
communities in the six districts of Istanbul run by the municipalities of the Justice and Development 
Party have often referred to the cultural and religious intimacy which they have practiced in everyday 
life with the Sunni-Arabs coming from Syria. Hence, religious and linguistic iconicities are not only 
instrumentalized by the Sunni-Muslim-Syrian refugees, but also by the members of the Sunni-Muslim 
local communities who have already reified the language and the ethnicity of the Sunni Arabs (Kaya 
and Kıraç, 2016; and Deniz et al., 2016).  
This kind of iconicity is not only limited to religious and linguistic levels, but also to gastronomic 
and musical tastes of both sides. The number of Syrian restaurants is rapidly increasing in Istanbul, not 
only in those six neighbourhoods where we conducted our research on the vulnerability of the Syrian 
refugees, but also in the touristic centres of the city such as Beyoğlu and Sultanahmet. These 
restaurants do not only attract the Arabs who feel a kind of cultural intimacy with the food and 
beverages served there, but also the locals of Istanbul who also feel a similar cultural intimacy with the 
Arabic cuisine, which has always been an essential part of the cosmopolitan Ottoman cuisine. 
Similarly, the number of Syrian street music bands is also increasing. Radio stations such as Al-Kol, 
Muftah and Alwan were established in Istanbul to broadcast not only to the Syrian Diaspora in Turkey 
but also to the homeland in Syria.
15
 The sound of Arabic music echoing in the streets of Istanbul as 
well as in the Arabic radio stations construct new bridges between the Syrian refugees and the 
members of the local communities who are somehow appealed to it by virtue of resemblance with the 
popular Turkish Arabesque music.  
The history of arabesk music in Turkey starts with the internal migration from rural spaces to urban 
spaces since early 1960s. It is an epiphenomenon of urbanisation. Arabesk is primarily associated with 
music, but also with film, novels and foto-roman (photo dramas in newspapers with speech bubbles). 
Arabesk music is a style which is composed of western and oriental instruments with an Arabic 
rhythm. This syncretic form of music has always borrowed some instruments and beat of the 
traditional Turkish folk music. The presence of the arabesk music on TV was banned by the state until 
the early eighties. The conservative-populist government of Turgut Özal set it free in the mid-eighties. 
The main characteristics of arabesk music are the fatalism, sadness and pessimism of the lyrics and 
rhythm. Hitherto, the lyrics were composed of an irrational and pessimist reaction of people with a 
rural background to the capitalist urban life. Recently, the composition of the lyrics has extensively 
changed. Instead of expressing pessimism in the urban space, lyrics tend to celebrate the beauty of the 
pastoral life which has been left behind. In other words, it has become a call to the people to go back 
to basics. It should be pointed out that there is an extensive literature on the sociological dimensions of 
the arabesk music in Turkey (Stokes, 2010). Martin Stokes (2010) has also shown how the fortunes of 
supposedly Arabic musical forms actually vary with the political winds. Today, arabesque music is 
likely to create a space of cultural intimacy and iconicity among the Syrians and the Turks living in the 
suburbs of Istanbul.  
However, some locals do not seem to be so much at ease with the Ansar Spirit. Treating the Syrians 
as “traitors” seems to be a common phenomenon among many Turks. One of the Turkish youngsters 
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 For the media coverage of the Syrian-origin radio stations founded in Istanbul see some examples such as 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/life-style/art-and-culture/2013/04/07/Syrian-opposition-radio-station-launches-from-
Istanbul.html;  
 http://muftah.org/sout-raya-a-syrian-voice-broadcasting-from-istanbul/#.WAdcPuh9600; 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30015656; and  
 http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/04/160418_istanbul_suriye_radyo . 
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we interviewed in the Sultanbeyli district of Istanbul, expressed his dislike against the Syrian refugees 
settled in his neighbourhood with the following words:  
“Everyone around me hates the Syrians. People are curious to know why the Syrians came to 
Turkey. If I were them I wouldn’t leave my country. I would stay home and fight back against the 
enemy to protect my homeland. Syrians are coward, that is why they left their country. They are 
traitors. Our country has accepted them as no one else is really accepting them. We are treating 
them well, but we are not getting anything good in return” (20, male, 16 November 2015, 
Sultanbeyli).
16
  
This kind of discourse has also recently become rather popular, especially after a popular 
conservative-pious-Muslim poet, İsmet Özel, treated the Syrian refugees in the same way as 
“traitors”.17 Defining the Arabs as traitors in Turkey is actually a rather old habit dating back to the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Turkish nationalists 
perceived the Arabs in those days as “traitors” since they believed that the Arab nationalists stabbed 
the Turks on their back by collaborating with the imperialist western forces.
18
 Such a stereotype is still 
very strong in collective memory of the Turkish citizens. 
When refugees were asked about how safe they feel in Istanbul, the majority have expressed 
feelings of safety (91.8 percent) while only 6.8 percent stated an uneasiness regarding safety in the 
city. Being away from the war zone and everyday terrors of violence in Aleppo, coupled with cultural 
intimacy and religious familiarity, have been reported as the main determinants of a feeling of safety 
and comfort for refugees in Istanbul, although women tend to feel slightly more in the extremes in 
terms of safety and insecurity in the city compared to Syrian men, who are in the more moderate to 
safe range of the spectrum. Mohammad, a 27-year-old male whom we have interviewed in Ümraniye 
explained his reason of picking up Istanbul to live in the following words:  
“I came here two years ago through the Turkish-Syrian border. I had to pay a lot of money to the 
smugglers. Turkey was my first choice, because there is better treatment here compared to other 
neighbouring countries in the region. And I feel safe here in Istanbul.”  
Syrian refugees were also asked to report about the problems that they face in everyday life: 30.4 
percent of the interlocutors complained about unemployment, while others respectively complained 
about their lack of knowledge of the Turkish language (17.4 percent), poverty (13 percent), 
exploitation (12.2 percent), discrimination (11.3 percent), and limited access to social services (7.8 
percent) (Graph 4). Poverty, exploitation, exclusion, and discrimination are the major problems stated 
by refugees. The cross-tabulations by gender indicate that women tend to feel more exposed to 
discrimination and racism in everyday life. Focus group discussions reveal that women are in a 
situation to negotiate more in everyday life with the members of the majority society with respect to 
handling the relations within their neighbourhood. Women are confronted with more problems while 
carrying out household chores and caring for family members, such as buying groceries, schooling of 
children, seeking health care, and finding their way around the city.  
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 Original Turkish text of the interview: “Çevremdeki herkes Suriyelilerden nefret ediyor. İnsanlar merak ediyorlar 
Suriyelilerin neden Turkiye’ye geldiğini. Ben onların yerinde olsaydım, ülkemi terketmezdim, orada kalır ve vatanımı 
düşmanlara karşı savunurdum. Suriyeliler korkak; o nedenle ülkelerini terkettiler. Onlar vatan hainidir. Bizim ülkemiz 
onları kabul etti, başka ülkeler onları almıyor bile. Biz onlara iyilik yapıyoruz, ama karşılığında iyilik görmüyoruz.” 
17
 For the speech of Ismet Özel see the following video recorded on 14 December 2015, 
https://twitter.com/fazzare/status/677191012738011140  
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 For further discussion on such stereotypes see Pope and Pope (1997). 
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Graph 4. Primary problem faced in Istanbul as a Syrian 
 
Abo Bashar, a 55-year-old male residing in Ümraniye, has drawn our attention to the difficulties of 
living in a city like Istanbul, though he has added that he is happy there:  
“I am happier here though it's hard. Because the treatment here is better than it is in the other 
countries. I am not planning to travel to any other country, but will go back to Syria one day. We 
wish that we had a work permit, and that the employers paid us a better salary. We don’t want to 
work under such conditions. We wished people here would treat us better and give us more 
assistance because we receive nothing. And we wished the landlords would go easy on us and take 
from us what the contract says they must take.”  
The will to return to Syria is still very strong, but of course it all depends on the improvement of 
political situation in the homeland.  
Graph 5. Missing family members in the war? 
   
However, among the Syrians we interviewed there is a very critical group of people who expressed 
their unwillingness to go back to Syria under any condition. Around 20 percent of the people 
interviewed expressed their unwillingness to go back home. It has later found that this group of 20 
percent people correspond to the ones who lost beloved ones in their immediate families (Graph 5). 
Hence, one could argue, that at least those who have lost family members in the civil war are not 
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willing to go back, at least for the time being, due to the traumatic experience resulting from their 
losses. 
As far as the exploitation of refugees is concerned, it is seen in the field research that cultural 
intimacy in the form of ‘the sharing of known and recognizable traits’ with the ones inside” may also 
play a negative role in everyday life. It is often revealed in migration studies that refugees and 
migrants are more likely to be exploited by their own kins, relatives, families as well as by those locals 
who have a cultural, religious and linguistic intimacy with them (Danis, 2007; Pessar, 1999). For 
instance, in the course of the research, we encountered Syrian refugees who were employed by those 
textile workshop owners who speak Arabic. These interlocutors explicitly complained about the 
exploitation they were exposed to. Healy et al. (2015) also found that much of the exploitation taking 
place among the Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq is not carried out by 
organised transnational groups, but rather involves acquaintances, neighbours and even family 
members. Hence, one should not forget about the fact that cultural intimacy has an ambivalent nature 
as a space of both comfort and danger. There should be more scientific studies concentrating on the 
correlation between cultural intimacy and different patterns of exploitation taking place amongst 
refugees. 
Conclusions 
This research, which has been conducted in six different districts of Istanbul (Küçükçekmece, 
Başakşehir, Bağcılar, Fatih, Sultanbeyli and Ümraniye) run by mayors of the Justice and 
Development Party has revealed that Syrian refugees residing in these districts predominantly 
originate from Aleppo, which was the third most cosmopolitan city of the Ottoman Empire after 
Istanbul and Izmir. It has been argued that refugees follow already existing social, ethno-cultural and 
religious networks, the origins of which could be found in the past. It has been stated by most of the 
refugees that it is this cultural and religious intimacy, which has made them feel rather comfortable in 
Istanbul. It has also been stated by the majority of the interlocutors that the reason why they have 
chosen Istanbul, is the feeling of security and safety that the city is providing them. 
However, they also have many complaints. Exploitation on the labour market, the lack of 
knowledge of the Turkish language, discrimination in everyday life, lack of empathy among the locals 
towards their sufferings, stereotypes, and prejudices generated by the locals, the lack of education 
facilities for their children, the lack of a proper legal status, the lack of the right to work legally, the 
lack of the right to health services, the lack of the right to housing, the lack of future prospects in this 
country, the lack of integration policies at central and local levels, the lack of social and political 
recognition, respect, and acceptance, and the ways in which they are labelled by the central state as 
“guests” are some of the problems they face in everyday life. It is exactly these problems which, in the 
end, prompt some refugees to leave Turkey at the expense of risking their lives at the border. 
Nevertheless, what came out as a surprise is the very low number of refugees among those 
interviewed who stated their willingness to go to Europe. It was found that only 1.6 percent of the 
refugees interviewed were considering to leave Istanbul for the purpose of travelling to the EU 
countries. But it does not mean that the situation is the same for all the Syrians living in Turkey. With 
more than 500.000 Syrian population, Istanbul has recently become the new capital city of Syrians 
offering its refugee-origin inhabitants with the opportunities feel contend with the cultural intimacy 
and iconicity that the city offers, and to disappear in crowds so that they could relatively enjoy 
accommodation facilities, employment, possibilities, schooling, health services, in-kind assistance and 
several other services without being stigmatized. However, the comfort zones created by cultural 
intimacy are also embedded with potential sources of danger and exploitation operated by 
acquaintances, neighbours and even family members of the refugees. 
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